Parliamentary effectiveness: Coalitional incentives and restrictions in Costa Rica and Nicaragua

This paper, which is part of a larger research, analyzes the legislative performance in the Parliaments of Nicaragua and Costa Rica, by studying legislative productivity and the effectiveness of parliamentary control, the formal and informal incentives that determine the exercise of the parliamentary opposition and their relations with the Executive Power. This research will therefore analyze the function and the real capacity of control, which should be understood in two fundamental dimensions: a) political-parliamentary control and b) legislative control, both cases in their formal and informal aspects. The different determinants of legislative performance will be analyzed: the a) parliamentary arithmetic, b) political-institutional performance of parliamentary minorities and c) the rights of parliamentary minorities.

Parliamentary effectiveness: Coalitional incentives and restrictions in Costa Rica and Nicaragua
Parliamentary effectiveness: Coalitional incentives and restrictions in Costa Rica and Nicaragua
Vargas & Petri - Parliamentary Effectiveness.pdf
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Dennis P. Petri
Dennis P. Petri is Director of Plataforma C, Platform for Christian Politics. A political scientist by training, he specializes in comparative politics with a specific interest in Latin America. He is currently working on a dissertation about religious freedom at VU University Amsterdam.

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